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Abstract  
This paper provides an empirical study of the determinants of income inequality across 
regions of the EU. Using the European Community Household Panel dataset for 102 regions 
over the period 1995-2000, it analyses how microeconomic changes in human capital 
distribution affect income inequality for the population as a whole and for normally working 
people. The different static and dynamic panel data analyses conducted reveal that the 
relationship between income per capita and income inequality, as well as between a good 
human capital endowment and income inequality is positive. High levels of inequality in 
educational attainment are also associated with higher income inequality. The above results 
are robust to changes in the definition of income distribution and may be interpreted as a sign 
of the responsiveness of the EU labor market to differences in qualifications and skills. Other 
results indicate that population ageing, female participation in the labor force, urbanization, 
agriculture, and industry are negatively associated to income inequality, while unemployment 
and the presence of a strong financial sector positively affect inequality. Finally, income 
inequality is lower in social-democratic welfare states, in Protestant areas, and in regions with 
Nordic family structures. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is often claimed that improvements in educational attainment affect income inequality 
(Berry and Glaeser, 2005; Shapiro, 2006) and that income and educational inequalities 
are perfectly correlated (Checchi, 2000). But, in spite of these claims, the influence of 
education on inequalities is still a long way from being perfectly understood, especially at 
a regional level. This paper addresses the questions of the variation in impact at different 
levels of education and of the positive correlation between inequality in education and in 
income for the regions of the EU. It aims to analyse how microeconomic changes in 
human capital distribution affect income inequality, not only for the population as a 
whole, but also for normally working people. We measure human capital distribution in 
terms of both the percentage of the labor force which has received primary, secondary, or 
tertiary education and of inequality in educational attainment. By analysing the 
microeconomic processes underpinning the relationship between individual educational 
endowments and income inequality, we also expect to draw greater light on whether 
education policies contribute to a more equal income distribution and whether the EU 
labor market is responsive to differences in qualifications, knowledge, and skills. 
The paper is organized in five additional sections. The next section reviews the existing 
debate over the determinants of income inequality, putting greater emphasis on the 
relationship between income and educational distribution. The empirical regression 
model and the relevant static and dynamic estimation methods are discussed in Section 3. 
Section 4 describes the data and the construction of variables. Section 5 reports and 
discusses the regression results and, finally, Section 6 concludes with policy 
recommendations and some suggestions for further research. 
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2. EDUCATION AND INCOME INEQUALITY: THEORETICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Given the vast body of literature on the determinants of income inequality, the aim of this 
section is not to review the whole array of sources, but simply to focus on how the impact 
of income per capita, as well as of primary, secondary, and tertiary education levels and 
inequality in educational achievement, on income inequality is perceived by the literature. 
To achieve that aim, we first review the link between income and inequality, before going 
on to analyse the impact of educational attainment and inequality on income inequality. 
We also consider the dynamic structure of inequality. 
Changes in the distribution of income take place at a very slow pace. There are several 
reasons for this. First, people are often reluctant to change jobs for psychological and 
institutional reasons (Gujarati, 2003). Additionally, income levels are often perpetuated 
from one generation to another by means of inheritance, cultural background, and, more 
generally, the characteristics of the community (Durlauf, 1996; Checchi, 2000). This 
allows for intergenerational stability in income, indicating the existence of a positive 
autocorrelation in inequalities. Cooper (1998), for instance, has pointed out that poorer or 
wealthier families tend to exhibit a greater degree of intergenerational income stability 
than middle income families. Hence, it is often the case that a proportion of the 
population remains trapped at the same level of income for more than one generation. 
Income differences are often viewed as an essential characteristic in rewarding 
achievement and, particularly, in ensuring that the most suitable people are allocated the 
most suitable roles. The presence of inequalities in income provides an additional 
incentive for achievement and innovation, which are an integral part of modern society. 
Some degree of inequality is generally perceived as a necessary constituent of a healthily 
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functioning economy (Champernowne and Cowell, 1998, pp. 14). The key question is 
whether the persistence of inequality has an impact on economic performance. Do 
unequal societies perform better than more equal ones or is it vice versa? 
This relationship has been most famously addressed by Kuznets (1955), who posits that 
income per capita has an inverted U-curve effect on income inequality. Income inequality 
increases as nations begin to industrialize and, then, declines at later stages of 
industrialization. This relationship is known as ‘Kuznets curve’. The Kuznets curve 
shows that in the early stages of industrialization, the labor force is primarily engaged in 
agriculture. As industrialization takes hold, workers move from the larger agricultural 
sector to the smaller industrial one and, since wages are usually higher in the industrial 
sector, this migration boosts further income inequality (Firebaugh, 2003). Income 
distribution thus becomes more unequal as income increases. Moreover, as the 
agricultural sector shrinks and industry increases in size, further transfers from 
agriculture to manufacturing reduce, rather than increase, income inequality. 
The key factors underlying the inverted U-curve effect of income per capita on inequality 
are industrialization and labor migration. The additional factors behind this association 
include market and government failures, government social expenditures, and the 
development of financial services. For example, De Gregorio and Lee (2002) show that 
income inequalities are negatively correlated with government social expenditure. 
Schultz (1962) indicated that modifications in income transfers and in progressive 
taxation are relatively weak factors in altering the distribution of income. Motonishi 
(2006) argues that the effect of financial service development on income inequalities is 
not straightforward. On the one hand, more developed financial services enable the poor 
to borrow from the rich and this leads to a decrease in income inequality; while, on the 
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other hand, financial services are often not available to the poor due to constraints on the 
credit market arising from information asymmetries. Finally, market failures, such as 
credit constraints and monopsony or monopoly power and government failures, often 
increase income inequalities (Graham, 2002). 
Despite the significant amount of research that has set out to test the Kuznets curve at the 
national level, the results are ambiguous (i.e. Ahluwalia, 1976; Anand and Kanbur, 1993; 
Checchi, 2000; Motonishi, 2006). Ahluwalia (1976), for instance, finds for a cross-
section of counties evidence to support the inverted U-curve, while Anand and Kanbur 
(1993) report that the Kuznets curve is not inverse at all. Overall, the literature seems 
unable to provide conclusive empirical results on the relationship between income 
inequality and per capita income, since social structures, such as historical heritage, 
religion, ethnic composition, and cultural traditions, evolve differently across countries 
(Checchi, 2000). In this paper, we do not expect to test the validity of the Kuznets curve 
for two reasons. Firstly, the majority of the relevant empirical studies focus not only on 
European, but also on less economically advanced countries. Secondly, the studies in 
question show that the declining segment of the Kuznets curve begins around 1970 
(Nielsen and Alderson, 1997). However, we use Kuznets’ theory in order to assume a 
linear association between income per capita and income inequality for developed 
countries over a relatively limited period of time. We therefore expect to find that over 
the period 1995–2000 income per capita was negatively associated with income 
inequality. 
The notion of education as an underlying factor in income differences also has a long 
history, dating back to the work of Adam Smith. Based on the work of Mincer (1958), 
Schultz (1961) and Becker (1962) income inequality is generally considered to be 
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affected by educational attainment, in a process which is sometimes referred to as ‘skills 
deepening’ (Williamson, 1991). However, the impact of endowments at different levels 
of education (i.e. primary, secondary, and tertiary) seems to depend on a country’s level 
of development (Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003), with tertiary education being the most 
important for the variation in income (Berry and Glaeser, 2005; Shapiro, 2006). A higher 
level of educational attainment is achieved through improvements in access to education 
(i.e. lower tuition fees, better education financing, improved vocational training), a higher 
quality of education (i.e. better services from teachers, librarians, and administrators), and 
greater investment in physical capital for education. Improved access to tertiary 
education, for example, is likely to increase the earning opportunity of the lowest strata, 
leading to a reduction in earning inequality (Checchi, 2000). Access to education is likely 
to provide for upward mobility and thus greater income equality. Furthermore, more 
widespread access to education allows for a more informed participation in the market 
economy, reducing the lobbying ability of the rich, while simultaneously increasing the 
social and job opportunities of the poor, implying lower inequality. Education is thus 
regarded as one of the most powerful instruments known for reducing income inequality 
(World Bank, 2002). 
According to Knight and Sabot (1983), the impact of different types of educational 
attainment on income inequalities depends on the balance between the ‘composition’ and 
the ‘wage compression’ effect. Concerning the ‘composition’ effect, an increase in 
tertiary education tends, at least initially, to increase income inequality. With respect to 
the ‘wage compression’ effect, over time education leads to decreased income inequality. 
An increase in tertiary education reduces the wages of highly-educated workers, because 
their supply goes up, and simultaneously raises the wages of the less-educated workers, 
because their supply goes down. Hence, a rise in the educated labor supply is likely to 
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increase competition for positions requiring advanced educational credentials and thereby 
should reduce the income differential between the more and the less educated (Tinbergen, 
1975). Moreover, an increased proportion of the population attaining a higher level of 
education leads to inflation in the value of educational credentials and, in the long-run, to 
decreasing wages for highly-educated workers. Thus, the effect of education on income 
inequality is based on a balance of supply and demand. 
Spence’s (1973) signaling model offers a different perspective on the relationship 
between income and education. This model demonstrates that education has no direct 
effect on income distribution, because education acts as a ‘label’ or ‘signal’. More 
specifically, his model posits a situation in which the possibility of higher pay for more 
educated people has little to do with academic and vocational skills, because formal 
education is seen as an elaborate device for detecting and labeling those who have skills 
(Champernowne and Cowell, 1998; Wolf, 2004). The individual’s education level is 
more closely related to innate ability and to psychological and personality traits, such as 
diligence, and these are what employers reward, rather than regarding education as a 
means of instilling or enhancing skills (Wolf, 2004). Differences in educational 
attainment may arise as a consequence of heterogeneity in ability. Galor and Tsiddon 
(1997), for example, support the idea that individuals with a higher level of innate 
cognitive ability can fare better with less knowledge than others do. For them, genetic 
characteristics are highly correlated with the education that children receive and their 
skills. In contrast, López, Thomas, and Wang (1998) support the notion that education 
levels are not necessarily correlated with abilities. Nevertheless, education still works as a 
marker for achieving better jobs. 
 9 
To sum up, given the complexity of the relationship between education and income, it is 
difficult to predict a priori the sign and the significance of the relationship between 
educational attainment and income inequality. 
On the relationship between educational inequality and income inequality most 
theoretical analyses tend to report that both factors are positively correlated (i.e. Jacobs, 
1985; Chakraborty and Das, 2005). More explicitly, Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002, 
pp. 1488) have pointed out that, with regard to the supply side of skilled labor education, 
a greater share of highly-educated workers within a cohort may signal to employers that 
those with less education have less ability, and hence the latter’s earnings may be reduced 
accordingly, which may also lead to a greater wage inequality between workers with high 
and low levels of education. With respect to the demand side of skilled labor education, if 
the demand for unskilled labor is either contracting or growing at a slower rate than the 
demand for skilled labor, then earning inequalities will increase. Finally, the empirical 
studies of Becker and Chiswick (1966) and Park (1996) show that a higher level of 
educational attainment among the labor force has an equalizing effect on income 
distribution, and that the greater the inequality in educational attainment, the greater the 
income inequality. 
3. ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
As a means to test the relationship between education and income inequality in a 
European regional context, we use microeconomic data to estimate income inequality as a 
linear function of per capita income, educational attainment, and educational inequality. 
We use different empirical specifications in order to assess the robustness of the 
econometric models and to examine the impact of adding control variables, such as 
population ageing, work access, and industrial composition. The methodology 
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incorporates variability both across regions )(N  and over time )(T  in a pooled cross-
sections analysis. Our emphasis is on the case where ∞→N  with T  fixed and on the 
one-way error component model, due to the limited number of observations. Different 
panel data analyses are conducted in order to reduce measurement error on inequalities 
and to minimize potential problems of omitted-variable bias. We also use panel data in 
order to allow for greater degrees of freedom than with cross-regional data and to 
improve the accuracy of the parameter estimates (i.e. Baltagi, 2005). 
This study deals with three methods of panel regression analysis: standard (non-spatial) 
static models, spatial (static) models, and dynamic models. These models are increasingly 
popular for panel data analysis among regional scientists. With repeated observations for 
a maximum 102 regions, panel analysis permits us to study the dynamics of change with 
short-time series. The basic characteristics of each method are presented below: 
(1) The standard static models endow regression analysis with both a spatial and 
temporal dimension. The former dimension pertains to a set of cross-regional units of 
observation, while the latter to periodic observations of a set of variables characterizing 
these cross-regional units over a particular time span. As the surveys of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) dataset – which is our main data source – were 
conducted regularly at approximately one-year intervals, the error terms of inequality 
regressions are expected to be correlated with the regional-specific effect. This can be 
addressed with fixed effects (FEs) panel data analyses. The static model is characterized 
by one source of persistence over time due to the presence of unobserved regional-
specific effects. Based on the specification tests of Hausman’s (1978) chi-squared 
statistic, and Breusch and Pagan’s (1980) Lagrange multiplier (LM), FEs correct for 
unmeasured regional-invariant factors. In addition, as FEs techniques can lead to 
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misleading results when most of the variation is cross-sectional (Partridge, 2005) – in the 
case of the income distribution measures over the six-year period considered – the 
random effects (REs) are also reported. Both FEs and REs estimators are based on a strict 
exogeneity assumption. 
In the static models, we assume that the regression disturbances are homoskedastic with 
the same variance across time and regions. However, heteroskedasticity potentially 
causes problems for inferences based on least squares. Assuming homoskedastic 
disturbances in the FEs model, for example, might be a restrictive assumption for panels 
(Baltagi, 2005). Thus when heteroskedasticity is present, the consistent estimates are not 
efficient. If every disturbance term has a different variance, the robust estimation of the 
covariance matrix is presented following the White estimator for unspecified 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). 
(2) The spatial models deal with substantive and nuisance spatial dependence induced by 
an exonesously determined weights matrix and provide a framework to test for the 
occurrence of interregional externalities (Rey and Montouri, 1999). We use two panel 
data models: the spatial autoregressive (SAR) and the spatial error (SE) model (Anselin, 
1988). The SAR model indicates how income inequality in a region is affected by those 
of neighboring regions and is a substantive type. Income is likely to spill over across 
regions through interregional trade, transfer payments, network and social capital and 
pecuniary, technological, and information externalities. In the SE model, spatial 
dependence works through omitted variables and is a nuisance type. Both models are 
estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) (Elhorst, 2003). In the SAR model, the spatial 
autoregressive parameter indicates the extent of interregional interactions, and in the SE 
model, the spatial error parameter expresses the intensity of spatial correlation between 
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regression residuals. Since the question of the correct spatial specification is a very 
important one and there are no spatial diagnostic tests for panel data models, the selection 
of one of the two models is based on the significance of the coefficients, the value of the 
log-likelihood function, and the diagnostic tests for the spatial cross-sectional models, 
such as the Moran’s I test adapted to estimated residuals (Cliff and Ord, 1981), the 
Lagrange multiplier test for residual spatial autocorrelation, as well as the Lagrange 
multiplier test for an additional residual spatial autocorrelation in the spatial 
autoregressive model (Anselin, 1988). 
(3) The dynamic models test for the existence of autocorrelation. In these models, we can 
obtain both short-run and long-run parameters. However, the equilibrium, for instance, 
may be constrained in the short-run because of supply rigidities or factor immobilities 
that are removed in the longer-run (Combes, Duranton, and Overman, 2005). The short-
run effect of an independent variable is the first year effect of a change in this variable, 
whereas the long-run effect is the effect obtained after full adjustment of income 
inequality. Long-run standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. The dynamic 
panel structure of our data is exploited by a generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimation (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The main idea behind GMM estimation is to 
establish population moment conditions and then use sample analogs of these moment 
conditions to compute parameter estimates (Baltagi, 2005). 
The dynamic model is characterized by two sources of persistence over time: 
autocorrelation due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors 
and unobserved regional-specific effects (Baltagi, 2005). FEs and REs estimators are 
likely to be biased and inconsistent, because the dynamic econometric model contains a 
lagged endogenous variable (Baltagi, 2005). The correlation between the explanatory 
 13 
variables and the error is handled by instrument variables. In GMM-DIFF estimations 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991), the endogenous variables in first differences are instrumented 
with suitable lags of their own levels, while the strictly exogenous regressors can enter 
the instrument matrix in first differences. This procedure is more efficient than the 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) two stage least squares estimator which does not make use of 
all of the available moment conditions (Ahn and Schmidt, 1995). The GMM-DIFF 
estimator may also be improved using the GMM-SYS estimator (Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) which uses not only lagged levels of the instruments for 
equations in first differences, but also lagged differences as instruments for equations in 
levels. The GMM methodology is based on a set of diagnostics. The tests of 
overidentifying restrictions are associated with Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982) 
statistics. They should not indicate correlation between the instruments and the error 
term. Additionally, the tests regarding serial correlation should reject the absence of first 
and second order serial correlation. Both the homoskedastic one-step and the robust one-
step GMM-DIFF and GMM-SYS estimators are presented. 
To sum up, in order to examine the impact of education on income inequality and to 
evaluate the robustness of the results, we experiment with a number of alternative 
specifications and include additional determinants to our equations. Broadly speaking, the 
advantage of dynamic over static models is that the former correct the inconsistency 
introduced by lagged endogenous variables and, also, permit a certain degree of 
endogeneity in the regressors. However, dynamic models do not deal with spatial 
dependence. 
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4. DATA AND VARIABLES 
As in other recent studies dealing with human capital variables across European regions 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Vilalta-Bufi, 2005; Ezcurra, 2007), the data used to estimate the 
econometric models come from the ECHP data survey conducted by the EU during the 
period 1994-2001 (wave2-wave8) and from the Eurostat’s Regio dataset. In the surveys 
individuals were interviewed about their socioeconomic status. Data stemming from the 
ECHP can be aggregated regionally at NUTS I or II level for the EU15. Unfortunately 
there are no data available for the Netherlands. Finnish regions also had to be dropped 
from the sample because of discrepancies between the regional division included in the 
ECHP and those in the Regio databank. The resulting database includes 102 NUTS I or II 
regions from 13 countries in the EU.1 On average 116,574 individuals were surveyed, 
with a maximum of 124,759 in 1997 and a minimum of 105,079 in 2001. 
The variable ‘Total net personal income (detailed, NC, total year prior to the survey)’ 
from the ECHP is used as the main source for the average income and the income 
inequality for the population as a whole. This variable is regionalized. Income is collected 
not only for each individual in the household, so as to measure income per capita and 
income inequality for the population as a whole, but also for each normally working (15+ 
hours/week) individual2 in the household in order to measure income per capita and 
income inequality for normally working people. Income per capita is transformed for the 
same level of prices using the harmonized indices for consumer prices and then is divided 
by 1,000. The total net personal income is the sum of wages and salaries, income from 
self employment or farming, pensions, unemployment, and redundancy benefits or any 
                                                 
1
 NUTS I data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Spain, Sweden. NUTS II data for Portugal and the UK. 
2
 This is extracted from the variable ‘Main activity status-Self defined (regrouped)’. 
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other social benefits or grants, and private income. Wages are the main source of personal 
income, and they constitute the 45 percent of the personal income of the whole of the 
population and the 78 percent of the personal income of normally working people 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios, 2007). 
Income inequality is calculated using the generalized Theil entropy index. This index 
considers a region’s population of individuals { }Ni ,...,2,1∈  where each person is 
associated with a unique value of the measured income. Income inequality within a 
region is defined as ∑
=
=
N
i
ii NyyInequalityIncome
1
)log( , where iy  is the income share 
that is individual i ’s total income as a proportion of the total income for the entire 
regional population. This index varies from 0 for perfect equality to Nlog  for perfect 
inequality. 
The education variables are calculated using the microeconomic variable ‘Highest level of 
general or higher education completed’ which is also extracted from the ECHP data 
survey. Individuals are classified into three educational categories: recognized third level 
education completed, second stage of secondary level education completed, and less than 
second stage of secondary level education completed. These categories, which are 
mutually exclusive, allow for international comparisons, because they are defined by the 
International Standard Classification of Education. We describe the educational 
attainment within a region in terms of the percentage of the population who have 
successfully achieved the above three levels of formal education in order to find which 
educational category is the critical factor in income inequality variations. For instance, 
the work of Berry and Glaeser (2005) and Shapiro (2006) indicate that tertiary education 
is critical in terms of spatial variations in earnings. 
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Following the work of Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2001), we also calculate the inequalities 
in educational attainment using an education Theil index. This is defined as 
∑
=
=
N
i
ii NzzInequalitylEducationa
1
)log( , where iz  is the human capital share, that is, 
individual i ’s higher education level completed as a proportion of the total human capital 
for the entire regional population. As in the case for income inequality, the index has a 
minimum value of 0  when the entire population is concentrated in a single educational 
category, and a maximum of Nlog . 
As a way of controlling for the impact of additional factors, we also examine the effect of 
additional quantitative time-variant variables on income inequality: the average age of 
individuals, the percentage of normally working (15+ hours/week) respondents, the 
percentage of unemployed respondents, and the percentage of inactive respondents within 
a region. The source of these variables is again the ECHP dataset. Other controls include 
the economic activity rate of the population, female activity, and the added value per 
capita of agriculture, industry, and services from the Eurostat’s Regio dataset. These are 
also time-variant indicators. The urbanization ratio of a region is constructed as the 
percentage of respondents who live in a densely populated area. Data for this variable are 
only available for 2000 and 2001 (ECHP data source), and not for all countries. We 
assume that the urbanization ratio from 1995 to 2001 remains constant. This variable, 
therefore, introduces observed time-invariant effects. 
The transformed dataset with means, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum 
value for each of the variables is reported in Table 1.3 The descriptive statistics show that 
the dataset is unbalanced, which is amenable to estimation methods that manage potential 
                                                 
3
 The descriptive statistics of the ECHP quantitative and qualitative variables can be provided upon request. 
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heterogeneity bias. Table 1 also depicts that income inequality, both for the population as 
a whole and for normally working people, has decreased slightly between 1995 and 2000. 
Educational inequalities followed a similar declining trend over the period of analysis, 
while the percentage of respondents with tertiary education has increased. Mapping 
income and educational inequalities in 1995 and 2000 shows that (1) inequalities are not 
randomly distributed in space, highlighting the spatial autocorrelation in inequalities, and 
that (2) the spatial distribution of inequalities has remained relatively stable between 
1995 and 2000, underscoring the persistence of inequalities (Appendix A.1). 
TABLE 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Year Source Obs 
Mean 
or 
percent 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
1995 ECHP 94 0.42 0.16 0.18 0.83 Income 
inequality 
Income inequality for the whole of the 
population (Theil index) 
2000  102 0.36 0.14 0.11 0.74 
1995 ECHP 94 9.76 3.54 3.40 18.93 Income per 
capita 
Income per capita for the whole of the 
population (/1000) 
2000  102 12.81 4.55 4.05 21.14 
1995 ECHP 94 0.24 0.08 0.13 0.49 Income 
inequality 
Income inequality for normally working people 
(Theil index) 
2000  102 0.21 0.07 0.06 0.41 
1995 ECHP 94 13.19 4.32 4.94 28.42 Income per 
capita 
Income per capita for normally working people 
(/1000) 
2000  102 16.62 5.21 5.80 29.31 
1995 ECHP 94 53.60 17.34 14.44 90.26 Primary Percentage of respondents with less than second 
stage of secondary level education completed 
2000  102 45.54 17.59 11.51 85.95 
1995 ECHP 94 27.29 16.58 7.25 63.34 Secondary Percentage of respondents with second stage of 
secondary level education completed 
2000  102 28.44 18.35 7.98 68.23 
1995 ECHP 94 19.11 10.66 1.80 40.94 Tertiary Percentage of respondents with third level 
education completed 
2000  102 26.03 15.02 3.58 55.56 
1995 ECHP 94 0.90 0.45 0.21 2.38 Educational 
inequality 
Inequality in education level completed (Theil 
index) 
2000  102 0.72 0.39 0.17 2.02 
1995 ECHP 94 45.19 2.29 39.76 51.39 Population 
ageing 
Average age of respondents 
2000  102 45.96 1.86 42.32 51.35 
1995 ECHP 94 52.27 7.24 33.59 67.78 Work access Percentage of normally working (15+ 
hours/week) respondents (self-defined) 
2000  102 53.79 6.97 36.56 67.55 
1995 Eurostat 65 54.90 7.47 42.00 74.80 Work access Percentage of economic acrivity rate of total 
population 
2000  94 57.89 6.61 42.90 74.50 
1995 ECHP 94 5.80 3.29 0.00 16.54 Unemployment Percentage of unemployed respondents (self-
defined) 
2000  102 4.46 2.80 0.59 14.85 
1995 ECHP 94 41.92 5.96 29.21 55.49 Inactivity Percentage of inactive respondents (self-
defined) 
2000  102 41.74 5.86 29.53 55.42 
1995 Eurostat 65 44.78 10.82 24.00 72.20 Women's work 
access 
Percentage of female's economic activity rate 
2000  94 49.15 9.14 26.70 72.90 
1995 Eurostat 101 0.44 0.32 0.01 1.42 Agriculture Added value per capita of agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing 
2000  97 0.44 0.33 0.01 1.44 
1995 Eurostat 101 4.33 1.77 0.84 9.28 Industry Added value per capita of mining and 
quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas and 
water supply, construction 2000  97 5.62 1.93 1.33 10.48 
1995 Eurostat 101 10.05 5.06 3.64 33.77 Services Added value per capita of services (excluding 
extra-territorial organizations and bodies) 
2000  97 14.41 5.92 5.12 38.71 
Wholesale and 
retail trade 
Added value per capita of wholesale and retail 
trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
1995 Eurostat 85 3.06 1.28 1.20 9.13 
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personal and household goods, hotels and 
restaurants, transport, storage and 
communication 2000  97 4.53 1.66 1.76 10.03 
1995 Eurostat 85 3.15 2.30 0.99 14.94 Finance Added value per capita of financial 
intermediation, real estate, renting and business 
activities 2000  97 5.20 3.29 1.20 19.68 
1995 Eurostat 85 3.09 1.35 1.17 9.70 
Public 
administration 
Added value per capita of public administration 
and defense, compulsory social security; 
education; health and social work; other 
community, social and personal service 
activities; private households with employed 
persons 2000  97 4.68 1.42 1.93 11.09 
Source: ECHP dataset and Eurostat’s Regio dataset 
The qualitative explanatory variables (time-invariant) classify regions into categories that 
are hypothesized to have some underlying similarity concerning welfare regimes, 
religion, and family structure. 
• Welfare regime: Following the work of Esping-Andersen (1990), Ferrera (1996), 
and Berthoud and Iacovou (2004), we use four welfare state categories: social-
democratic (Sweden, Denmark), liberal (UK, Ireland), corporatist or conservatism 
(Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Germany, Austria) and residual or ‘Southern’ 
(Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece). The hypothesis is that a country’s welfare policy 
has an important effect on income redistribution and thus on income inequalities. 
The above classification assumes that a country belongs to only one welfare state 
regime. In reality, there is no single pure case because the Scandinavian countries, 
for instance, may be predominantly social-democratic, but they are not free of 
liberal elements (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 28). 
• Religion: The European regions’ religious affiliation is classified into four 
categories4: mainly Protestant (Sweden, Denmark, northern Germany, Scotland), 
mainly Catholic (France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Austria, 
                                                 
4
 Sources: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook;  
http://commons.wikimidia.org/wiki/Image:Europe_religion_map_de.png; 
http://csi-int.org/world_map_europa_religion.php 
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parts of southern Germany, Belgium), mainly Anglican (England and Wales) and 
mainly Orthodox (Greece). It is hypothesized that regions with the same religion 
have close social links so at to have similar income inequality levels within-
groups of religion, but different inequality between-groups. 
• Family structure: Following the work of Berthoud and Iacovou (2004), we use 
three groups of countries in the study of living arrangement: Nordic (Sweden, 
Denmark), North/Central (UK, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Austria) 
and Southern/Catholic (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece). The hypothesis is 
that a country’s family structure plays a significant role in income inequality. 
5. REGRESSION RESULTS 
The empirical analysis exploits the panel structure of the dataset, for the 102 EU regions 
included in the analysis over the period 1995-2000, using FEs and REs estimations in the 
standard static models, ML in the spatial models, and GMM estimation (both GMM-
DIFF and GMM-SYS) in the dynamic models taking into account the unobserved 
regional-specific effects. We first report the static regression models, followed by the 
dynamic ones.5 
Estimations of the Static Models 
In all the regressions of income inequality for the population as a whole, the p-values of 
Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier test strongly reject the validity of the pooled 
                                                 
5
 In our study we have considered the differences between the sample and the population (Gelman, 2007). 
Our results for the inequality measures are, however, robust by region with and without weights. We, 
therefore, only report the regression results without weights. This may be the result of Eurostat’s role in 
leading both the elaboration process of the survey design of the ECHP data set and of the Eurostat’s region 
database, making comparisons reliable. 
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OLS models, and the p-values of Hausman’s test reject the GLS estimator as an 
appropriate alternative to the FEs estimator. Therefore, the FEs models are the most 
appropriate. There is also not much difference between the significance of the 
homoskedasticity and the heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. The 
determinants of income inequality are thus not sensitive to the model specification of the 
error term. Table 2 displays the FEs regression results, complemented by REs for those 
equations where time-invariant indicators are considered. 
TABLE 2: FEs and REs Regression Results 
FEs REs  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Income per 
capita 
-0.0001 
(0.0011) 
(0.0013) 
0.0020 
(0.0014) 
(0.0016) 
0.0048 
(0.0016)*** 
(0.0017)*** 
0.0158 
(0.0022)*** 
(0.0025)*** 
0.0208 
(0.0024)*** 
(0.0027)*** 
-0.0007 
(0.0016) 
(0.0017) 
0.0026 
(0.0013)* 
(0.0014)* 
0.0000 
(0.0013) 
(0.0015) 
0.0028 
(0.0013)** 
(0.0014)** 
Secondary 
 
0.3652 
(0.0833)*** 
(0.1222)*** 
0.2405 
(0.0785)*** 
(0.1027)** 
0.2854 
(0.0781)*** 
(0.1023)*** 
0.2678 
(0.0779)*** 
(0.0928)*** 
0.3402 
(0.1161)*** 
(0.1904)* 
0.1500 
(0.0767)* 
(0.1031) 
0.1789 
(0.0796)** 
(0.1281) 
0.2015 
(0.0711)*** 
(0.1014)** 
Tertiary  0.2661 
(0.0747)*** 
(0.1127)** 
0.1564 
(0.0720)** 
(0.0941)* 
0.2497 
(0.0710)*** 
(0.0952)*** 
0.2492 
(0.0705)*** 
(0.0844)*** 
0.2751 
(0.0851)*** 
(0.1482)* 
0.0905 
(0.0688) 
(0.0950) 
0.1813 
(0.0720)** 
(0.1135) 
0.1156 
(0.0682)* 
(0.0979) 
Educational 
inequality 
 0.1661 
(0.0318)*** 
(0.0506)*** 
0.1021 
(0.0309)*** 
(0.0422)** 
0.1249 
(0.0300)*** 
(0.0423)*** 
0.1064 
(0.0300)*** 
(0.0378)*** 
0.1563 
(0.0343)*** 
(0.0650)** 
0.0880 
(0.0290)*** 
(0.0430)** 
0.1222 
(0.0303)*** 
(0.0521)** 
0.1015 
(0.0284)*** 
(0.0437)** 
Population 
ageing 
 
 
-0.0056 
(0.0022)*** 
(0.0024)**   
    
Unemployment   0.5325 
(0.1391)*** 
(0.1482)***   
    
Women’s work 
access 
  -0.0063 
(0.0012)*** 
(0.0013)***   
    
Agriculture   
 
-0.0941 
(0.0336)*** 
(0.0274)*** 
-0.0773 
(0.0338)** 
(0.0262)*** 
    
Industry   
 
-0.0262 
(0.0048)*** 
(0.0056)*** 
-0.0231 
(0.0050)*** 
(0.0058)*** 
    
Services   
 
-0.0068 
(0.0019)*** 
(0.0019)*** 
 
    
Wholesale and 
retail trade 
  
  
-0.0267 
(0.0100)*** 
(0.0104)** 
    
Finance   
  
0.0082 
(0.0043)* 
(0.0044)* 
    
Public 
administration 
    -0.0270 
(0.0088)*** 
(0.0105)** 
    
Urbanisation 
 
  
   
 
-0.2530 
(0.0500)*** 
(0.0512)*** 
   
Welfare 
regime 
 
   
 
 X1   
Religion        X2  
Family 
structure 
 
   
  
  X3 
Observations 604 596 513 586 566 378 596 596 596 
R-within 0.0000 0.0648 0.1933 0.1922 0.2350     
LM test 
(p-value) 
916.46 
(0.0000) 
662.92 
(0.0000) 
654.90 
(0.0000) 
478.98 
(0.0000) 
388.13 
(0.0000) 
431.91 
(0.0000) 
847.77 
(0.0000) 
819.77 
(0.0000) 
925.07 
(0.0000) 
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Hausman test 
(p-value) 
71.46 
(0.0000) 
66.30 
(0.0000) 
53.98 
(0.0000) 
101.31 
(0.0000) 
202.09 
(0.0000) 
    
Notes: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. (*), (**), and (***) denotes the significance 
of the White (1980) estimator (robust standard errors). LM test is the Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals 
(Breusch and Pagan, 1980). Hausman test is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects. The models contain constant. X1, X2, and X3 indicate 
the presence of welfare regime, religion and family structure dummies, respectively. The full set of results can be provided upon request. 
Regression 1 analyses the impact of income per capita on income inequality. This 
equation is unconditioned by any other effects. The relationship between income per 
capita and inequality is negative, but statistically insignificant. The adjusted R-squared 
shows that income per capita does not explain any variation in income inequality in the 
sample. In terms of goodness-of-fit, this suggests a poor unconditioned model. In the FEs 
conditional regressions (Regressions 3–5) income per capita becomes positively 
correlated with income inequality. The higher the income per capita, the higher the 
inequality within a region. A plausible explanation for this is that regional economic 
development seems to increase the occupational choices and the earning opportunities of 
the rich (Lydall, 1979). In all the regressions, however, the coefficients on income per 
capita are very low. For instance, Regression 5 shows that an increase of one per cent in 
income per capita is associated with, on average, about 0.0208 per cent more income 
inequality, as measured by the Theil index. 
The next step in the analysis sees the introduction of human capital distribution. 
Considering primary education level completed as our base category, we include the 
percentage of respondents with secondary and tertiary education, as well as the within-
region educational inequality. The regression coefficients indicate that both secondary 
and tertiary education influence the resulting income distribution. The relationship is 
positive, robust, and statistically significant. The higher the secondary and the tertiary 
educational attainment, the higher the income inequality, with secondary education 
normally having a greater sway on the variation in income inequality, as its coefficient is 
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higher than the coefficient on tertiary education. The empirical results also show that a 
highly unequal distribution of education level completed is associated with higher income 
inequality. This relationship is robust and statistically significant. 
A larger share of highly-educated workers within a region may signal to employers that 
those with less education have less ability, which may also lead to a larger wage 
differential between highly-educated and less-educated workers and thus to higher 
income inequality. An increase in the levels of education of the highly-educated tends to 
increase income inequality as the imperfect competition for positions requiring advanced 
educational credentials raises the wages of educated people even more. Our results are in 
line with Dickey’s (2007) view that income inequality increases with the level of 
education, but clash with many of those reported earlier that point to education as a 
powerful instrument in reducing inequality (i.e. Checchi, 2000; World Bank, 2002). 
Another potential explanation is that the demand for unskilled labor grows at a slower 
rate than the demand for skilled labor. This positive relationship may also be a sign of the 
responsiveness of the EU labor market to differences in qualifications and skills. 
The remaining regressions include the control variables described earlier. The fact that 
age matters for income inequality is hardly surprising, as regions with a younger 
population also tend to have a lower rate of participation in the labor force and young 
people in work earn less in a European labor market that traditionally rewards seniority, 
increasing the inequality levels within a society (Higgins and Williamson, 1999). In order 
to capture the economic activity characteristics of the regions, unemployment and 
women’s participation in employment are also included in Regression 3. The results 
indicate that high unemployment is associated with higher income inequality. Increases in 
unemployment aggravate the relative position of low-income groups, because marginal 
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workers with relatively low skills are at the bottom of the income distribution and their 
jobs are at greater risk during an economic downturn (Mocan, 1999). The coefficient on 
the female economic activity rate is negative and significant. The impact of the increase 
in women’s access to work has been to reduce income inequality.6 
Regression 4 controls for sectoral composition. An increase in the added value per capita 
of agriculture, industry, and services is associated with a decrease in inequality. However, 
decomposing the service sector into wholesale and retail trade, finance, and public 
administration (Regression 5), highlights how different sub-sectors have a different 
association with income inequality. Whereas a greater emphasis on wholesale and retail 
trade and on public administration is negatively associated with inequality, a 
specialization in finance leads to greater income polarization. 
The FEs estimator is not provided for the time-invariant controls as there is no within-
group variation in these variables. Hence for Regressions 6-9, we display the REs results 
of the impact of urbanization and institutional variables on income inequality. Regression 
6 reports the negative correlation between urbanization and inequality. Considering 
Kuznets’ assumption that urbanization is a measure of economic development, the 
negative relationship highlights the fact that European societies are located in the 
declining segment of the Kuznets curve. However, this rejects Estudillo’s (1997) and 
Sassen’s (2001) hypothesis that the heterogeneity of urban areas enhances, rather than 
lowers, inequality. Highly-urbanized regions seem not only to be more prosperous — the 
                                                 
6
 The work access variables measured by the percentage of normally working respondents (source: ECHP) 
and the economic activity rate of the total population (source: Eurostat) are negatively associated with 
income inequality and are statistically significant, while the coefficient on inactivity is not statistically 
significant. These results can be provided upon request. 
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correlation between income per capita and urbanization is positive (0.46) — but also less 
unequal. 
Regression 7 checks for the influence of welfare regimes. The omitted category is social-
democratic welfare states. The regression results show that all welfare regimes are 
important determinants of income inequality. Social-democratic welfare states, which in 
theory promote a higher standard of equality, indeed lead to lower levels of income 
inequality than corporatist welfare states, in which private insurance and occupational 
benefits play a truly marginal role and corporatism displaces the market as a provider of 
welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In addition, social-democratic welfare states are more 
egalitarian than corporatist ones because, in the former, the welfare state minimizes 
dependence on the family and allows women greater freedom to choose work rather than 
to stay at home, while in the latter state intervention is more modest and comes into effect 
mainly when the family’s capacity to service its members becomes exhausted (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). Corporatist welfare states in turn have higher levels of income 
inequality than liberal welfare states. However, both regimes are more egalitarian than 
‘residual’ ones. 
Regression 8 introduces religion as an explanatory variable. Mainly Protestant regions, 
which are the base category, have a lower level of income inequality than Catholic ones. 
Orthodox regions have the most inegalitarian societies. Finally, it is interesting to note 
that all categories of family structure and living arrangements affect income inequality 
significantly (Regression 9). Regions with a Nordic family structure are the most 
egalitarian societies and Southern/Catholic regions have the highest inequality. 
The regression results of income inequality for normally working people are similar to 
the regression results of income inequality for the population as a whole, apart from the 
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coefficients on population ageing, agriculture, and services which are not statistically 
significant.7 More specifically, income per capita is positively associated with income 
inequality. Once more, the impact of secondary and tertiary educational achievement, as 
well as of educational inequality on income inequality is positive, robust, and statistically 
significant. Finally, income inequality for normally working people is, once again, lower 
in social-democratic welfare states, in mainly Protestant areas, and in regions with Nordic 
family structures. 
Table 3 displays the estimation results by ML for the SAR and SE models for panel data. 
Results were obtained for the 3- and 5-nearest neighbors. First of all, the Moran’s I test 
(Cliff and Ord, 1981) adapted to estimated residuals suggests spatial dependence. While 
the value of the log-likelihood function is slightly higher for the SE than the SAR models, 
the significance of the coefficients is higher for the SAR. In addition, the robust version 
of the Lagrange multiplier test for spatially lagged endogenous variable rejects the null 
hypothesis of no spatial dependence, but the robust version of this test for residual spatial 
autocorrelation rejects it (Anselin and Florax, 1995; Anselin et al., 1996).8 Hence, the 
SAR is the most favored specification. This specification shows positive and statistically 
significant coefficients on income per capita, secondary education, tertiary education, and 
educational inequality, which are consistent with the non-spatial regression models of 
Table 2. Moreover, a spatial spillover effect is found, as the average income inequality 
within a given region is influenced by those of neighboring regions. The above results are 
robust to the choice of the spatial weights matrix. 
                                                 
7
 These results can be provided upon request. 
8
 These results can be provided upon request. 
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TABLE 3: ML Regression Results 
SAR model SE model 
3 nearest neighbours 5 nearest neighbours 3 nearest neighbours 5 nearest neighbours 
 
Spatial fixed 
effects 
Spatial and 
time period 
fixed effects 
Spatial fixed 
effects 
Spatial and 
time period 
fixed effects 
Spatial fixed 
effects 
Spatial and 
time period 
fixed effects 
Spatial fixed 
effects 
Spatial and 
time period 
fixed effects 
Income per 
capita 
0.0025 
(2.0694)** 
0.0110 
(7.4369)*** 
0.0027 
(2.2678)** 
0.0105 
(6.9906)*** 
0.0065 
(3.8820)*** 
0.0139 
(8.5526)*** 
0.0107 
(5.5390)*** 
0.0153 
(8.6921)*** 
Secondary 0.2632 
(3.5967)*** 
0.2032 
(2.9591)*** 
0.2337 
(3.2796)*** 
0.1863 
(2.7393)*** 
0.1889 
(2.3261)** 
0.1600 
(2.2027)** 
0.0990 
(1.2260) 
0.1114 
(1.5086) 
Tertiary 0.1722 
(2.6310)*** 
0.1347 
(2.1540)** 
0.1359 
(2.1342)** 
0.1117 
(1.8041)* 
0.0371 
(0.4836) 
0.0732 
(1.0750) 
-0.1042 
(-1.3062) 
0.0039 
(0.0554) 
Educational 
inequality 
0.1221 
(4.3626)*** 
0.1059 
(4.0328)*** 
0.1065 
(3.9048)*** 
0.0966 
(3.7085)*** 
0.0951 
(3.0769)*** 
0.0911 
(3.2907)*** 
0.0601 
(1.9539)* 
0.0719 
(2.5538)** 
Spatial error 
parameter     
0.3490 
(8.6628)*** 
0.1960 
(4.3499)*** 
0.5260 
(13.1743)*** 
0.3190 
(6.3295)*** 
Spatial 
autoregressive 
parameter 
0.3050 
(6.9716)*** 
0.1240 
(2.5822)*** 
0.4120 
(8.6282)*** 
0.2150 
(3.9069)*** 
    
R-squared 0.9566 0.9627 0.9589 0.9635 0.9572 0.9634 0.9609 0.9646 
Log-
Likelihood 
1162.6891 1212.342 1175.4238 1216.5509 1163.6524 1215.5082 1181.4173 1222.1353 
Observations 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 
Notes: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Estimations of the Dynamic Models 
Table 4 presents the short-run and long-run results of the dynamic models of income 
inequality for the population as a whole. The first column of each model specification 
assumes that the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, while in the second column 
the explanatory variables are endogenous. This table also reports the tests statistics of 
serial correlation and overidentifying restrictions. 
TABLE 4: GMM Regression Results 
GMM-DIFF GMM-SYS 
1 2 3 4 
 
exogenous endogenous exogenous endogenous exogenous endogenous exogenous endogenous 
Lagged income 
inequality 
0.7531 
(0.1234)*** 
(0.1199)*** 
0.6965 
(0.1451)*** 
(0.1525)*** 
0.8834 
(0.1439)*** 
(0.1517)*** 
0.5191 
(0.1361)*** 
(0.1801)*** 
0.7640 
(0.1128)*** 
(0.0939)*** 
0.6680 
(0.0898)*** 
(0.0946)*** 
0.8703 
(0.1370)*** 
(0.1349)*** 
0.5049 
(0.0801)*** 
(0.1037)*** 
Income per 
capita 
 
Lagged income 
per capita 
0.0139 
(0.0026)*** 
(0.0027)*** 
-0.0057 
(0.0031)* 
(0.0032)* 
0.0132 
(0.0042)*** 
(0.0050)*** 
-0.0017 
(0.0065) 
(0.0045) 
0.0173 
(0.0032)*** 
(0.0033)*** 
-0.0106 
(0.0045)** 
(0.0047)** 
0.0258 
(0.0057)*** 
(0.0061)*** 
-0.0138 
(0.0065)** 
(0.0072)* 
0.0126 
(0.0024)*** 
(0.0026)*** 
-0.0058 
(0.0031)* 
(0.0031)* 
0.0116 
(0.0027)*** 
(0.0031)*** 
-0.0065 
(0.0025)** 
(0.0027)** 
0.0153 
(0.0029)*** 
(0.0032)*** 
-0.0096 
(0.0044)** 
(0.0047)** 
0.0166 
(0.0027)*** 
(0.0034)*** 
-0.0117 
(0.0037)*** 
(0.0046)** 
Secondary 
 
 
Lagged 
secondary 
  
0.1831 
(0.1230) 
(0.1180) 
-0.1389 
(0.1332) 
(0.0787)* 
0.2948 
(0.1944) 
(0.1603)* 
0.1262 
(0.2037) 
(0.1609) 
  
0.1572 
(0.1209) 
(0.1189) 
-0.1207 
(0.1303) 
(0.0781) 
0.1734 
(0.1025)* 
(0.1025)* 
-0.0097 
(0.1006) 
(0.0701) 
Tertiary 
 
 
Lagged tertiary 
 
 
0.2288 
(0.1159)** 
(0.1110)** 
-0.2530 
(0.1165)** 
(0.0862)*** 
0.4721 
(0.1847)** 
(0.1844)** 
-0.1325 
(0.1539) 
(0.1193)   
0.1963 
(0.1139)* 
(0.1119)* 
-0.2196 
(0.1142)* 
(0.0864)** 
0.3433 
(0.0952)*** 
(0.1111)*** 
-0.0944 
(0.0842) 
(0.0628) 
Educational 
inequality 
 
 
 
0.0850 
(0.0454)* 
(0.0399)** 
0.0907 
(0.0686) 
(0.0538)* 
  
0.0740 
(0.0446)* 
(0.0403)* 
0.0968 
(0.0329)*** 
(0.0367)*** 
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Lagged 
educational 
inequality 
-0.0684 
(0.0480) 
(0.0248)*** 
0.0148 
(0.0668) 
(0.0461) 
-0.0639 
(0.0471) 
(0.0246)*** 
-0.0114 
(0.0349) 
(0.0216) 
Observations 400 400 392 392 400 400 392 392 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
12.26 
(0.1989) 
18.09 
(0.1541) 
11.41 
(0.2485) 
 
 
30.35 
(0.2116) 
 
 
10.54 
(0.309) 
8.50 
(0.485) 
57.96 
(0.000) 
37.36 
(0.015) 
9.68 
(0.377) 
7.42 
(0.593) 
102.53 
(0.000) 
63.90 
(0.247) 
AR(1) test 
(p-value) 
-5.85 
(0.0000) 
-4.42 
(0.0000) 
-4.82 
(0.0000) 
-4.09 
(0.0000) 
-5.59 
(0.0000) 
-3.85 
(0.0001) 
-4.88 
(0.0000) 
-3.31 
(0.0009) 
-5.96 
(0.000) 
-4.42 
(0.000) 
-6.60 
(0.000) 
-4.72 
(0.000) 
-5.68 
(0.000) 
-3.78 
(0.000) 
-6.83 
(0.000) 
-4.26 
(0.000) 
AR(2) test 
(p-value) 
-1.19 
(0.2339) 
-0.68 
(0.4977) 
-1.14 
(0.2562) 
-0.65 
(0.5188) 
-1.50 
(0.1332) 
-0.88 
(0.3774) 
-1.32 
(0.1853) 
-0.87 
(0.3865) 
-1.22 
(0.224) 
-0.68 
(0.494) 
-1.27 
(0.204) 
-0.71 
(0.480) 
-1.51 
(0.131) 
-0.86 
(0.391) 
-1.28 
(0.202) 
-0.72 
(0.471) 
Long-run 
parameters         
Income per 
capita 
0.0331 
(0.0137)** 
(0.0143)** 
0.0377 
(0.0136)*** 
(0.0151)** 
0.0577 
(0.0681) 
(0.0784) 
0.0251 
(0.0107)** 
(0.0137)* 
0.0285 
(0.0131)** 
(0.0140)** 
0.0154 
(0.0073)** 
(0.0068)** 
0.0436 
(0.0478) 
(0.0561) 
0.0099 
(0.0062) 
(0.0069) 
Secondary   0.3786 
(1.3684) 
(1.1513) 
0.8754 
(0.4303)** 
(0.4506)* 
  0.2810 
(1.2010) 
(0.9881) 
0.3306 
(0.2391) 
(0.1972)* 
Tertiary   -0.2079 
(1.4621) 
(1.4002) 
0.7062 
(0.3506)** 
(0.3872)* 
  -0.1797 
(1.2731) 
(1.2060) 
0.5029 
(0.2258)** 
(0.2372)** 
Educational 
inequality 
  0.1420 
(0.5254) 
(0.4217) 
0.2194 
(0.1225)* 
(0.1016)** 
  0.0785 
(0.4723) 
(0.3737) 
0.1726 
(0.0810)** 
(0.0779)** 
Notes: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. (*), (**), and (***) denotes the significance 
of the White (1980) estimator (robust standard errors) at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Overall, the specification tests are satisfactory. The Sargan tests do not indicate 
correlation between the instruments and the error term of the first differenced equation, 
because they do not reject the overidentifying restrictions, except for the GMM-SYS 
estimators which assume that the explanatory variables are endogenous. The Hansen tests 
also do not reject the overidentifying restrictions, apart from Regression 3 and assuming 
that the explanatory variables are endogenous. The tests for serial correlation reject the 
absence of first order, but not second order serial correlation.9  
All the equations reject that the lagged income inequality coefficient is zero. In both 
GMM-DIFF and GMM-SYS estimators, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
                                                 
9
 We have also contemplated the possibility of weak instruments in the GMM estimation. Weak 
instruments correspond to a weak identification of some or all of the unknown parameters which may result 
in GMM statistics with nonnormal distributions, leading to the possibility of misleading conventional 
GMM inferences (Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002). Our results are robust to experimentation with different 
lag lengths, allowing us in all likelihood to discard the possibility of weak instruments. 
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is positive and statistically significant at the one per cent level, and it is higher when the 
explanatory variables are assumed to be exogenous than endogenous. Hence, one 
expected finding is that income inequality in the current period depends on income 
inequality in the previous period. The rationale for this result is simple: income inequality 
does not change radically over one year and job mobility is rather low. People tend not to 
change jobs for psychological, technological, and institutional reasons (Gujarati, 2003). 
The short-run coefficient on income per capita is positive and statistically significant, 
regardless of the explanatory variables considered. In addition, the coefficients on 
secondary education, tertiary education, and educational inequality are positive, as in the 
case of the FEs regression results which also capture the short-run effects (Mairesse, 
1990). The reason why some lagged educational variables are not significant may be that 
the time series variation in these variables is limited. 
Considering the long-run parameters, the results indicate that income inequality increases 
in the long-run as income per capita increases, thus leading to a positive correlation 
between the two variables. For instance, if the endogenous income is increased by one 
per cent, income inequality will rise by 0.0377 per cent in the long-run for the GMM-
DIFF estimator and 0.0154 per cent in the long-run for the GMM-SYS estimator 
(Regressions 1 and 3, respectively). This goes against the assumption of the presence of a 
declining segment of the Kuznets curve, but also fails to reject Lydall’s (1979) hypothesis 
that only a limited number of people can be transferred to higher levels of skills, while 
the remainder have to wait their turn. This result is consistent with the FEs conditional 
regressions. 
The findings also indicate that the higher the secondary education, the tertiary education, 
and the educational inequality, the higher the income inequality in the long-run, but only 
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when the explanatory variables are assumed to be endogenous. According to the 
estimated value and assuming, for example, that income and human capital variables are 
endogenous, a one per cent increase in the coefficient on tertiary education would lead in 
the long-run to a 0.7062 per cent increase in income inequality for the GMM-DIFF 
estimator and a 0.5029 per cent increase for the GMM-SYS (Regressions 2 and 4, 
respectively). Once more, secondary education has the strongest association with the 
variation in income inequality. The combined positive impact of educational attainment 
and inequality on income inequality implies that, although educational expansion 
improves the opportunities for individuals, the returns tend to be higher for the rich than 
for the poor and rich people have more opportunities to engage in higher paid jobs. 
Additionally, the positive relationship between income and educational inequality further 
indicates a responsiveness of the EU labor market to differences in qualifications and 
skills. Education is likely to raise the individual’s marginal product in the future and 
therefore his/her future income (Barr, 2004, pp. 296). 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Different static and dynamic panel data analyses have been conducted in order to 
examine how microeconomic changes in educational distribution in terms of both the 
percentage of the labor force that has received primary, secondary, or tertiary education 
and inequality in educational achievement, as well as, changes in income per capita affect 
the evolution of income inequality across regions of the EU over the period 1995-2000. 
Our methodology incorporates variability both across regions and over time. 
Taking into account the specification tests applied to the estimated models, the 
relationship between income per capita and income inequality seems to be positive, no 
matter what income distribution is considered. Regional economic development seems to 
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increase more the occupational choices and the earning opportunities of the rich, rather 
than of the population as a whole. The short-run and long-run impact of secondary and 
tertiary education on income inequality is positive with secondary education having the 
strongest association with inequality. There is also a positive and robust relationship 
between educational inequality and income inequality. Other results indicate that 
population ageing, female participation in the labor force, urbanization, agriculture and 
industry are negatively associated to income inequality, while unemployment and a 
specialization in the financial sector positively affect inequality. Finally, income 
inequality is lower in social-democratic welfare states, in Protestant areas, and in regions 
with Nordic family structures. 
The results have policy implications as they shed light on the ambiguous impact of 
income per capita on income inequality. They show that improving access to secondary 
and tertiary education relative to primary education and providing higher skills may not 
have the desired effect on income inequality. They also indicate that income and 
educational inequality are connected, highlighting the responsiveness of the EU labor 
market to differences in qualifications and skills. Since both income and human capital 
inequalities have decreased slightly between 1995 and 2000, a more equal educational 
distribution may help to improve the economic opportunities and incomes of the less 
well-off without challenging the European social systems and without requiring any 
major redistribution of capital. 
Although our methodology addresses the question of how changes in income per capita, 
educational attainment, and educational inequality affect the observed income inequality, 
further research is needed. The fact that data on only a limited time period were available 
means that the results should be interpreted with some caution. Longer time-series will 
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reinforce the analysis. The classification of individuals into just three educational 
attainment categories represents a further simplification and limitation. 
Despite these caveats, the results of the paper have contributed to shed light on the 
complex relationship between education and inequality, with results that, in some cases, 
tend to challenge the dominant views. From this perspective, it raises interesting 
questions that future research will need to address.   
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APPENDIX A.1: The Spatial Distribution of Income and Educational Inequalities (Theil Index) 
Educational inequality in 2000
0.1744 - 0.3641
0.3642 - 0.5815
0.5816 - 0.8216
0.8217 - 1.2888
1.2889 - 2.0223
No data
Income inequality in 2000
0.1676 - 0.2560
0.2561 - 0.3322
0.3323 - 0.4321
0.4322 - 0.5475
0.5476 - 0.7368
No data
Educational inequality in 1995
0.1750 - 0.2595
0.2596 - 0.3541
0.3542 - 0.4721
0.4722 - 0.6126
0.6127 - 0.8296
No data
Income inequality in 1995
0.1750 - 0.2595
0.2596 - 0.3541
0.3542 - 0.4721
0.4722 - 0.6126
0.6127 - 0.8296
No data
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